Future computers will be integrated in objects of everyday life. The number of processors in the environment will increase and data will be distributed over different nodes. New classes of information and devices will appear, i.e. data will be catched from environmental sensors and will be used for context extraction. The amount of new devices and services makes an efficient use by centralized systems very difficult. Mobile agents provide an eminent method by virtualizing the user and performing actions on her behalf. They offer a possibility to encapsulate information of a person and her preferences, likings, and habits and perform location-based services of the ubiquitous system in the name of the user. This paper presents a mobile agent system application, where a mobile user-agent follows the user while she moves in the physical space. The user-agent knows personal information and communicates with service-agents in the name of its user to perform special tasks. Because of the personal data security and privacy are major concerns of such an agent system. The paper describes the communication of agents and agent nodes and focuses on the security extensions required by this approach.
INTRODUCTION
Ubiquitous systems should be invisible and unobtrusive. In order to adapt to user actions and to environmental changes the ubiquitous system must be aware of context information. Context is the situation arising by realization and interpretation of environmental information. To collect this information automatically sensors are placed in the environment which even can communicate with each other over wireless media.
Besides the location of the user personal information like profiles, preferences, liking, and habits are indispensable. In case of location changes of the person the personal information have to be sent to the current location. These information could be stored on wearable devices carried by the user. The user would be responsible for security and privacy issues, e.g. by not loosing the device. The power consumption of wearable devices is an additional problem. It can lead to a loss of availability. Often it is inconvenient for users to carry such devices. Because of this users are inclined to forget the devices in their offices or at home. We assume here that the ubiquitous environment takes care for storing and sending the personal information. The mobile person is always accompanied by a mobile virtual object in the ubiquitous environment. So location-based services adapted to personal profiles can be offered.
Two implementation paradigms can be used: distributed or centralized. The paradigm of mobile agents ideally fits for the distributed approach. The mobile agent constitutes a virtual reflection of the user and carries personal information which enables the agent to perform various services for the user. Additionally the mobile agent can use the environmental information which is provided by the local ubiquitous system. Mobile agent systems are distributed and work on heterogeneous platforms which are requirements for ubiquitous systems. Personal context of users needs to be secured on foreign nodes to anticipate spying out personal data. Therefore security is an essential factor for the acceptance of ubiquitous mobile agents.
Certainly the ubiquitous environment could be realized as a server-centric approach. But concerning personal movements and data this would lead to a big-brother-is-watching-you scenario where entities who gain access to the server would have access to global personal information. Regarding ubiquitous environments a central server would rapidly become a bottleneck because of the amount of clients and services running on the system. Moreover a failure on the server would endanger the whole system. The agent system is applied in an office building where electronic doorplates offer flexible office services. Mobile user agents accompany the person who is tracked by a location tracking system and can instruct service agents to perform tasks for the user.
We implemented three applications using UbiMAS: a direction scenario where a visitor is navigated with arrows displayed on electronic doorplates, an e-mail application where an employee can assign her user agent to inform her about expected e-mails at each doorplate in the office building, and a file access application where the employee can securely read or download files which are placed on a PC where she has read access.
The next section deals with related work. The subsequent section describes the system architecture of UbiMAS and the communication extensions. Then the UbiMAS security section follows. Section 6 presents some applications and evaluation results. The paper ends with the conclusion.
RELATED WORK
Security in mobile agent systems is examined in various research projects. [4] describes a security concept where mobile agents only migrate to trustful nodes. [14] replaces the concept of trust by a concept of reputation. Agents can increase or decrease the reputation of nodes dependent on the experiences that they make with the nodes. To protect against occupation of node resources by agents [10] defines a restriction on the number of times an object can be accessed. These projects affected our security approach mapping the ideas on the requirements of ubiquitous environments.
The idea of using mobile agents in ubiquitous environments appears in several projects. In [9] a flexible mobile code approach is described which is used in a ubiquitous and active augmented reality system. The user inspects the world through this AR system and is tracked by a location-tracking system. When she enters a space of a real object which has an active tag, a mobile code is downloaded on the user's device and is executed by a Mobile Code Engine. The mobile code contains executable information, e.g. appropriate user interfaces, but it is not a mobile agent system because the mobile code isn't autonomously performing a service.
The Hive system [12] is a distributed agent platform for building applications by networking local system resources. Agents are used to control devices in ubiquitous computing environments. Hive also supports agent migration. However the agents here are simply remote objects, e.g. buttons, without an agent communication infrastructure.
[15] and [17] describe a framework which is very similar to our approach. The framework provides a way for mobile agents to follow their users as they move around and to adhere to places as virtual post-its. However the papers describe only a framework and shift the security issues to the used agent system and the Java Virtual Machine.
[5] presents a supervisor-worker model where supervisor agents can manage worker agents that are sent out to collect information. This is very similar to our separation of user-and service-agents. The main difference is that the supervisor agent moves to a location where the worker agents will work and resides there until all relevant results are brought back. The supervisor has full access on the methods of a worker, so control is realized by method calls.
There are some research projects on ubiquitous systems for office and home environments. The Active Badge system described in [19] is an IR-based location tracking system. It is used in an office scenario, where phone calls are redirected to the current location of the user. The Aware Home project [11] aims to built a ubiquitous house to create a living laboratory for research in ubiquitous computing for everyday activities. Using various sensors new applications are implemented like the identification of person over a Smart Floor or finding Frequently Lost Objects. Mozer [13] proposes an Adaptive Control of Home Environments (ACHE). ACHE monitors the environment, observes the actions taken by inhabitants, and attempts to predict their next actions.
All of these projects are one-server-centric. We chose a distributed approach obviating central point storage of information.
UBIMAS ARCHITECTURE
The UbiMAS architecture [1] [2] is depicted in figure 1 . An agent node consists of a Message Delivery Engine, a Migration Engine, which has a Serializer/Deserializer component, a PoBox and a PoBoxAdder for each agent. On the base level there are interfaces to the middleware peer. 
Figure 1: UbiMAS Architecture
UbiMAS is designed to run as a service on top of a middleware. It is assumed that the middleware bases on peer-to-peer technology. Each agent node in UbiMAS relies on at least one middleware peer. One middleware peer could manage more than one agent node. The communication between peers is realized with peer messages which are sent over pipes. The interfaces to the middleware offer all running services the possibility to send their own messages. Messages belonging to a service have a specific type. Checking this types the middleware can deliver different messages to the appropriate service. Because of the type structure it is easy to extend the system with new services. A middleware which implements this interfaces can host a UbiMAS agent node.
We have realized two middleware implementations: the first one is a basic JXTA [16] middleware, which has only the agent nodes as services, the second middleware is the Autonomic Middleware for Ubiquitous eNvironments called AMUN [18] . AMUN is designed with the goal in mind to foster the device independent application of autonomic computing demands proposed by IBM in ubiquitous environments [8] . UbiMAS communication is fully based on peer messages. The next section describes the UbiMAS communication.
UBIMAS COMMUNICATION
UbiMAS takes up the peer-to-peer communication ideas where peers exchange messages over specific pipes. The central part of an agent node in UbiMAS is the Message Delivery Engine. Each agent and each node is identified over a unique ID. The middleware delivers the messages, which are actually byte-streams, to the appropriate IDs. When a message arrives the Message Delivery Engine checks if the recipient is the node or an agent. If it is an agent, which has already migrated to the next node, the Message Delivery Engine forwards the message to this node. If the agent still resides on the current node the message is handed over to the PoBox. All messages of agents or nodes which need to be send are passed to the Message Delivery Engine, which then performs security functions on the core messages data, completes the message headers, packs them into the right format and delivers it to the middleware peer. Each message is acknowledged by the recipient.
The PoBox manages the message transfer between agents and node and between agents among each other. Each agent and the PoBox have queues for incoming messages. The PoBox has only the possibility to write a message into the message queue of an agent. Arriving the node each agent is started with its own PoBoxAdder. The PoBoxAdder is comparable with a postman. It is the only connection of an agent to the node. The agent hands over its messages to the PoBoxAdder which writes them into the assigned PoBox queue on the node. The PoBox has a limited queue for each agent for incoming messages and sends them one after another. This approach represents a secure way for message exchange between agents and nodes (see next section).
UbiMAS is implemented in a generic way using abstract nodes and abstract agents. In this form UbiMAS can be used in all kinds of agent applications. In our office scenario we implemented an extension for UbiMAS where we distinguish two kinds of mobile agents: user-agents and service-agents. User-agents are always near the person they accompany and store her personal data, on which basis they can make decisions supporting the user. They build the interface between the user and the service-agents. Service-agents offer services which the user-agents can call on in the name of the user. Each user-agent has its home node. Usually it is the office node of the user. The user-agent frequently informs the home node about its location, so other nodes can ask the home node about the current location of the user-agent.
If an agent wants to migrate to another node it sends a migration request message to the node. The Message Delivery Engine recognizes the request and hands over the message to the Migration Engine. The agent object and its class are sent as a byte-stream message. The Migration Engine is responsible for serializing the agent code into a byte-stream and for deserializing arrived agents. The nodes store the IDs of the agents once loaded and the IDs of their home nodes. If the Message Delivery Engine has to send a message to an agent where it doesn't know the location it can ask the home node of the agent or send a findAgent message to the peer-group. The underlying middleware AMUN offers services the functionality to register themselves as listeners to specified types of messages
The agent nodes can form alliances in form of agent node peer groups independent from the middleware peer groups. If two peers want to build a peer group they have to arrange new pipes which are built using a pipe advertisement. The advertisement contains a unique pipe ID. Only the peers which know this ID can receive the messages sent over this pipe. Figure 2 shows an example for UbiMAS peer groups. Each agent node which wants to join a peer group must send a request. The peer group members can decide if this request will be accepted or rejected. Inside of a peer group the agent nodes communicate over a secure communication protocol. Messages to foreign nodes outside the peer group are still possible but are not secured. Different peer groups can build a partnership. Applied to an office building each floor could build a peer group, and floors of the same institution could form an alliance. This makes it possible for agent nodes to communicate with nodes from other peer groups.
UBIMAS SECURITY

Threat Analysis
The security architecture of UbiMAS deals with various aspects. The aim is to protect both the agents and nodes against malicious behaviors. A secure system is essential for the acceptance because personal data is sensitive [7] . The following four security issues specific to mobile agent systems are defined in [6] . These are:
• protection of the host against agents,
• protection of agents against other agents,
• protection of agents against host,
• protection of the underlying network.
Each involved entity of the mobile agent system can be regarded as a potential intruder. Malicious agents could be used to forward confidential information or to attack other entities. Nodes have full access to the agent code and therefore could clone agents, manipulate the migration path or attack the host PCs. The host PCs and the communication network offer a broad basis for attacks on the agent communication and migration. There are other entities who could endanger the agent system, like administrators, authors, owners and agent users. The administrator installs, configures and maintains the mobile agent system. He could arbitrarily manipulate the system. The author develops the mobile agents and could
Figure 2: UbiMAS Peer Group Example
build a Trojan horse or hidden functions. In some cases the owner and the user of mobile agents are different persons. The owner describes the person who feeds the system with agents. He could consciously bring malicious agents into the system. The user can't bring new agents into the system but utilizes the agents and could apply many agents trying to start a Denial-of-Service attack. These threats can be classified in two protection domains: protection of agents against hosts and protection of agents and host against rogue agents. To stem the potential attacks UbiMAS realizes various security approaches which are described below.
Protection of Agents against Hosts
UbiMAS assumes only trustful nodes. The nodes are installed by an administrator. We assume here social protection mechanisms. The administrator and the author of the agent nodes are known. It is supposed that these persons will act trustful in their own interest. Infiltration of foreign nodes is not possible because of certificates and keys for each service. Furthermore only UbiMAS peers of the same application can form a peer group. Each peer group has its own certificate which is validated during communication. All messages in UbiMAS are coded using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) approaches. If the sender node doesn't know the public key of the receiver it first asks for it and stores it for future communication.
The main point therefore is to protect the agent node and agents against malicious mobile agents.
Protection of Agents and Hosts against Rogue Agents
The first step in this direction is to secure the message exchange between agents and nodes. The PoBoxAdder is here an excellent solution and has several protection functionalities.
Protection against impersonating is realized through the property that the sender of messages isn't set by the agent but by the PoBoxAdder. This means that an agent can't disguise as another agent. Furthermore the PoBox has a limited queue for messages. The node can change the length of each queue dynamically. Agents can only send until the queue is full. Besides this the node can set a timer. The agents have to wait until the timer is expired before they can send a new message. The messages of all different PoBox queues are served by a fair scheduling algorithm. This makes denial of service attacks by agents against nodes more difficult. In the case of an attack the node can set the queue-length of the concerning agent to zero blocking further sendings.
One more protection approach results by avoidance of references. This means that no mobile agent knows direct references on the node or other agents, i.e. the agent can't call external functions or access external data. The only interface for communication is the PoBoxAdder.
Each agent reaching the actual node gets the public key of this node. All messages which the agent sends to the PoBoxAdder are coded with the public key of the node. In the same way the node codes messages to an agent with its public key. So even if an other agent gets this messages it has no possibility to decode the information. With this approach UbiMAS can allow all kinds of agents, even malicious ones.
To provide platform independence UbiMAS is implemented in Java. To execute an agent the node has to know its class. The agent usually migrates with its class. The node has the responsibility for securing that the agent code won't be manipulated during migration. This is done by encryption. However, here a security gap may arise because agents could be started with the wrong class which have the same name as the agent class. UbiMAS ensures that mobile agents are always loaded with the right class. If the class isn't known the node requests it from the sender node.
Since in UbiMAS there is no limitation for agents and agent authors it is impossible to avoid name conflicts through a name convention. To avoid name collisions each agent has its own class loader. This enables separation of name spaces. Since generic classes could be loaded redundantly we differentiate between standard and non-standard agent classes. The agent node implements a standard class loader that loads the communication classes. Remaining agent-specific classes are loaded by the agent class loader. In that way the communication classes are loaded only once on the node.
UbiMAS disallows cloning of agents. All user-agents are loaded only once per person. During migration the nodes observe that the agents are deleted after acknowledged transfer. The same serviceagent can be loaded several times but each agent becomes its own unique ID, so there are no clones of service-agents, too.
In our office scenario service-agents are allowed to access resources on hosts. This access needs to be secured. This is done using the Security Manager of Java. The problem here is that the Security Manager protects the system only against applications. However mobile agents are not applications but implemented as threads. If the Security Manager would give permissions to an agent as ap-plication all agents on this node would get the same access. This is naturally not acceptable. What we need here is a permission system for single threads. The problem on threads is that the thread ID changes after agent migration, because each node starts a new thread for each received agent. To guarantee that only a specific agent gets the access rights on chosen resources it needs an access approach based on a unique identification technique independent from the thread ID. UbiMAS implements a Security Extension of the Java Security Manager where rights on system resources can be applied for agent threads. The Security Manager requires several attributes like username, password, permission name, permission parameters and a permission ID. To ensure that this permission ID is unique it is calculated using the agent ID and is decoded using public/private key mechanisms. Therefore the calculated ID is independent from the thread ID and is unique because all agent IDs are unique.
Besides the nodes the agents have their own private/public keys. To secure the message exchange the agents can encrypt the information in the messages with the public key of the receiver agent or node which subsequently decrypts it with its private key. Furthermore agents always store encrypted personal data of its user. There is no possibility to access this data because the only access to agents is by messages over the PoBox.
If an agent wants to migrate to another node it asks the node to send the agent to the destination. There are two methods for migration. The agent can ask for transfer directly to a node or it can ask for transfer to the node where a specific agent resides. For the second method the actual node may start a finding procedure for the destination agent. In both cases the agent that wants to be transferred waits for migration by sleeping. In that time the agent can still receive messages. The sender node tries to build a bidirectional connection to the receiver node. If this was possible, the node begins with transfer preparations. The node also uses private/public key encryption for agent migration. It serializes the agent code, uses the public key of the recipient node for encryption and packs it into a message. Additionally the messages received for the current agent are attached to this message. The destination node realizes that the message has a mobile agent type. It decrypts the message with its private key, deserializes the agent and wakes it up. After that the node delivers the messages to the agent which were received in meantime.
APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND EVALUATION
To evaluate UbiMAS we have implemented several scenarios for our flexible office and present here one user-agent scenario and three service-agent scenarios. For each user (employee or visitor) exists a user-agent as reflective agent which is fed into the system when the person physically enters the building. The smart doorplates [3] offer an interface between user-agent and the user. If a user wants to utilize a service, she stops in front of the next doorplate. The location tracking system based on RFID recognizes the user and fires an event containing the user ID. The user-agent catches this event and migrates to this smart doorplate. After authenticating herself the user can choose a service. If the user wants to go to an office and don't know the way she can ask her user-agent for navigating her. The user-agent then displays arrows in the direction the user has to go. Knowing the next doorplates the user will pass, the user-agent jumps ahead and shows the right direction. If the user reaches the destination the agent displays a reached message. Figure 3 shows a picture of one smart doorplate and figure  4 shows the floor of our institution with a smart doorplate at each In the e-mail scenario an employee has her office PC where she retrieves e-mails and can arrange to be notified if she expects a special e-mail. Because of security reasons she doesn't want to receive all her incoming mails on a foreign smart doorplate. She instructs her user-agent to check the e-mails appropriate to a special filter and to inform her when matching e-mails were found. The user-agent calls an E-mail Service Agent and gives it the filter in coded form. At the same time it applies for the required rights on the host PC for checking e-mails. The Service Agent moves now to the agent node on the host PC. There the host can validate the ID of the agent and can set the rights, which were requested by the user-agent before. Now the service-agent can search the received e-mails using the filter. If the agent finds a matching e-mail it migrates to the node where the user-agent is and gives the results to the user-agent. The File Reader Agent and the File Fetcher Agent perform in the same way. The first one only reads out a file, e.g. a log-file which the employee wants to see, and displays the contents on the doorplate. The File Fetcher Agent brings a specific file to a wished doorplate and stores it into a public folder.
The movement of the mobile agent should be faster than the movement of the person. Usually the migration of the agent has some delay because the location tracking system takes some time to recognize the person and to fire an location event. In order to evaluate UbiMAS with its security extensions we measured the ping time (PT), i.e. the time an agent needs to jump from a node to another and back via 100MBit-LAN. We increased the size of data carried by the mobile agent. The measurement is taken once with encryption/decryption the agent code during migration and once without encryption. Figure 5 
CONCLUSION
This paper presented the ubiquitous mobile agent system Ubi-MAS. Ubiquitous systems will store personal user data. This is the reason why UbiMAS cares much for security aspects. Mobile agents namely carry user specific information and perform services in the name of the person. It is essential that agents and nodes are protected against malicious agents. For this UbiMAS offers various security features. The PoBox is one of them used to ensure that no agent has references to other agents or nodes. We described UbiMAS communication protocols for secure message exchange between agents and nodes. We implemented different scenarios for flexible office buildings with smart doorplates where we differentiated between user-agents and service-agents. The agent system bases on an autonomic middleware which provides additional application possibilities for the agent system. We currently explore how mobile agents can support the self-monitoring and selfconfiguring features of the autonomic middleware system. Ubi-MAS is designed in a generic way ensuring broad application possibilities.
